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The Need for a Compelling Interest Test on a
State Level
by Eva Brady*

T

I. Introduction

hough religious freedom has been held among the most highly esteemed of all American rights, in the past twenty years,
this freedom has been drastically reduced by the loss of the
Sherbert Test—the compelling interest test for cases involving religious rights. This test mandates that citizens are to be exempt from
laws of general applicability when these laws conflict with their free
exercise of religion. Laws of general applicability are laws that are
not aimed at restricting religious freedoms but happen to do so as an
unintended consequence. This exemption holds except in cases in
which the burden on the person’s religion:
(1) “Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”1
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II. Background
A. Institution of the Compelling Interest Test
Two main cases originally established the compelling interest
test for cases concerning religious freedom: Sherbert v. Verner2 in
1963 and Wisconsin v. Yoder3 in 1972. In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh Day Adventist woman was fired from her job in South Carolina
because she refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons. Unable to find other suitable work because of her religious convictions,
she filed for unemployment. However, South Carolina denied her unemployment because she rejected suitable work when it was offered
to her. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the state and
appellate courts by ruling that the denial of unemployment compensation was an infringement of the appellant’s First Amendment right
to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court also argued that
there was no compelling state interest (or strong governmental interest) in denying the appellant unemployment because of her religious
convictions. They also ruled that allowing for an exception to South
Carolina’s unemployment policy on behalf of a Seventh Day Adventist was not “establishing” the religion.4 This case laid the framework for the compelling interest test.
Nine years later, Wisconsin v. Yoder upheld the ruling and cemented the precedent set in Sherbert v. Verner. In this case, Amish
and Mennonite parents were convicted by the Green County court of
Wisconsin for violating the Wisconsin state law requiring compulsory school attendance by withdrawing their children from school
when they had completed the eighth grade. After eighth grade,
these children were educated by their parents in practical work that
would help them to benefit their communities. The parents argued
that the compulsory school attendance laws restricted the practice
of their religion which valued keeping themselves and their children
2

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

3

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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“aloof from the world.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed
the previous court decision and ruled that the compulsory school attendance laws were a violation of their rights to religious freedom.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this ruling on the
grounds that there was no compelling state interest to burden these
people’s beliefs by making them adhere to the compulsory school
laws.5 However, despite these and other cases6 that successfully applied the Sherbert Test, the test was soon to come under scrutiny in
Employment Division v. Smith.7
B. Overthrow of the Compelling Interest Test
In 1990, twenty-seven years after the institution of the Sherbert
Test, one case was able to revoke the compelling interest test. It was
replaced instead with a rational basis test for religious cases, which
came to be known as the Smith Test. The case was brought before
the courts by two men who had been fired from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation facility because they had ingested the drug peyote
during their religious sacramental services in a Native American
church. Peyote use was against Oregon’s criminal law, and thus they
were dismissed from their jobs on the basis of work-related misconduct. Because they were fired for misconduct, they were unable
to receive unemployment compensation. On remand, the Supreme
Court of Oregon ruled that prohibiting the sacramental use of peyote
was a violation of the First Amendment. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed this ruling on the grounds that the state law regarding
peyote use was constitutional and not aimed at restricting the individuals’ religious beliefs; thus the state could deny the defendants’
unemployment compensation.8
The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled that under the free exercise
clause of the Bill of Rights, such laws of general applicability did
not need a compelling interest test, but would rather be subjected
5

Yoder, 406 U.S.

6

People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964) is another example.
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Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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to a rational basis test.9 The Smith Test, or rational basis test for
cases involving religion, examines the law that burdens the citizen’s
religious belief to see if the law was aimed at restricting such a belief and if the legislature had a rational reason for enacting such a
law. If the law was not aimed at a religious belief and was rationally enacted, then the law is upheld, regardless of the burden that it
may place upon religious convictions. The Smith Test denigrated the
strict scrutiny that was required by the compelling interest test; this
was a big change.
C. Restoration of the Compelling Interest Test
The Sherbert Test was not completely eroded with Employment
Division v. Smith. Just three years after this case many religious, political, and other organizations joined forces to support the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).10 This act was passed in 1993 by
an overriding majority: unanimously in the house and ninety seven
to three in the Senate.11
The Congress found when implementing RFRA that:
1. the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to
the Constitution;
2. laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
3. governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
4. in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify bur9

Id.

10

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3
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Chris Heinss, Beyond The Smoke And Mirrors: Defeating The Urge To
Nullify Or Glorify Religious Copyright Law, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 677
(2003).
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dens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
5. the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.12
For these reasons, Congress enacted RFRA in order to restore the
compelling interest test and to ensure that it was applied in all cases
in which religious freedom was substantially burdened, even by laws
of general applicability. RFRA was to be a defense for all citizens
who felt their religious freedom was being substantially burdened by
the government and was to apply to all cases, both state and federal.13
D. Compromise of the Compelling Interest Test
Although RFRA was passed almost unanimously by Congress,
its validity was soon to be questioned by the Supreme Court of the
United States in City of Boerne v. Flores.14 This case was brought
before the courts by an Archbishop in San Antonio, Texas. A parish
of his church in the nearby town of Boerne, Texas, had outgrown its
church building and the Archbishop had given permission to make
plans to enlarge their building. A few months later, however, the city
passed an ordinance requiring its Historic Landmark Commission to
pre-approve any construction that may affect historic landmarks in
the city. The Boerne church building was among these historic landmarks and upon applying for a building permit, the Archbishop was
denied permission to enlarge the building. The Archbishop brought
his case to the Western District of Texas Court, appealing to RFRA
for protection. The District Court ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional on the basis that Congress had superseded the powers given
to it in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 states that
“the Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legis12

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3
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lation, the provisions of this article.”15 The provisions mentioned in
Section 5 refer back to Section 1, which states that no “state [shall]
deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”16
In 1997, this case was brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, which
agreed that RFRA superseded Congress’s authority and added that it
was impractical and unconstitutional.
First, the Court determined that RFRA was an overextension of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment right to ensure that all citizens
were not deprived of liberty without due process of law.17 According
to the ruling in South Carolina v. Katzenbach as well as the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended only to extend to remedial powers.18 The court
claimed that RFRA alters the meaning of the free exercise clause and
that it does not have the power to impose the Sherbert Test upon the
states. Such an action infringes upon the division of state and federal
powers and is damaging to the constitutional structure of the United
States. Second, the Court argued that RFRA was unconstitutional by
an appeal to Marbury v. Madison, which established the precedent
for judicial review.19 Judicial review allows for the Supreme Court
to determine the constitutionality of any statutes, laws, or acts of
Congress. The Supreme Court had ruled in Employment Division
v. Smith that the courts did not have to demonstrate a compelling
state interest in order to enforce laws of general applicability that
may substantially burden religion.20 In spite of this, Congress passed
RFRA, which mandated that the Sherbert Test must be applied to
all federal and state cases in which the free exercise of religion was
threatened. The Supreme Court’s ruling as to the constitutionality
of the Sherbert Test should take precedent to the RFRA because it
endangers the separation of powers between Congress and the Judi15	U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
16

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

17

Flores, 521 U.S.
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

20

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
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ciary.21 For these reasons and others, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that RFRA was unconstitutional as it applies to the states.22 In other
words, RFRA would be maintained on a federal level and would
still be appealed to in federal cases, but Congress could not impose
RFRA upon the states. Thus, it was left up to the states to establish a
compelling interest test within their own states if they chose to do so.
In response to this ruling, many states did exactly that; they adopted the compelling interest test within their states in the form of
state RFRAs. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas.23 These states have all
taken this important measure to better protect religious freedom.
The compelling interest test protects religious freedom much more
effectively than the rational basis test does. The following analysis
explains why states that have not yet adopted a compelling interest
test to protect religious beliefs ought to do so.

III. Compelling Interest Test v. Rational Basis Test
In Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Flores, she concluded:
It has long been the Court’s position that freedom of
speech—a right enumerated only a few words after the
rights to Free Exercise—has a special Constitutional status. Given the centrality of freedom of speech and religion
to the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that both should be treated
with the highest degree of respect . . . the rule the Court
declared in Smith does not faithfully serve the purpose of

21

Flores, 521 U.S.

22

Id.
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Erin J. Cox, Freeing Exercise At Expression’s Expense: When RFRA
Privileges the Religiously Motivated Speaker, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 169, 171
(2009).

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

20

the Constitution. Accordingly, I believe it essential for the
Court to reconsider its holding in Smith.24
Although Justice O’Connor’s opinion failed to persuade the court in
Flores, it made evident the importance of sustaining the compelling
interest test. Though both tests have their benefits, the benefits of the
compelling interest test are much more defensible and far outweigh
those of the rational basis test.
A. Benefits of a Rational Basis Test
As the opinion of the Court in Employment Division v. Smith
stated, one concern regarding the compelling interest test that would
support a rational basis test is that a compelling interest test could
allow for too many anomalies in the law.25 In other words, it could
justify the breaking of many laws in the name of religion. For example, there have been instances in which the compelling interest test
has permitted the use of illegal drugs where the rational basis test
would not.26 However, as Justice O’Conner argued in her concurring
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, a compelling interest test
would not necessarily create too many anomalies in the law because
it is not very difficult to find a compelling state interest.27 For example, she claimed that in the Smith case the government did have a
compelling interest in regulating drug use. O’Connor’s opinion can
be backed by the fact that there are many cases in which appeals
to RFRA or the compelling interest test have failed. These cases
tend to fail for several reasons: (1) because they are faulty claims to
RFRA, in which the case at hand does not really deal with religious
convictions,28 (2) because they are fraudulent claims, in which the
individual does not really hold the religious conviction that he claims
24

Flores, 521 U.S. at 564.

25

Smith 494 U.S.

26

Compare Smith, ibid. to Gonzales, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).

27

Id.

28

Grace United Methodist Church v. Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (2006).
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he does, but is simply using the façade of religion to fulfill his or
her purposes,29 and (3) because there is a compelling governmental
interest and upholding the law of general applicability, despite the
burden that it would place upon religion, is truly the least restrictive
means of upholding that interest.30 There have been cases that have
exemplified each of these three instances. Thus it seems evident that
the compelling interest test does not create too many anomalies, but
rather simply allows for sufficient exceptions in order to properly
protect religious freedom.
Another argument of the Court in Employment Division v. Smith
is that the compelling interest test had only been used in hybrid cases
(cases involving religious freedom in conjunction with another right),
and thus that it did not extend to all cases in which religious freedom
was concerned.31 It is true that the compelling interest test had only
been used in such cases, as well as in cases involving unemployment
compensation; however, it does not follow that the compelling interest test should not extend to all cases concerning religious freedom.
Religion should be defensible simply by an appeal to the first amendment, and should not need to be in conjunction with another right in
order to deserve full protection.
A third argument in behalf of the rational basis test was addressed
by Justice Stevens as a concurring opinion in Flores. Justice Stevens
argues that RFRA is a “law respecting an establishment of religion,”32
which is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment that prohibits Congress from making laws respecting the establishment of religion. However, the compelling interest test does not
establish a religion, but is rather legislation designed to protect the
free exercise of religion as it is protected by the First Amendment.
Another supposed benefit of the rational basis test is that with the
compelling interest test it may seem difficult for the courts to decide
29

See Trujillo v. Wyoming, 2 P.3d 567 (2000); Nesbeth v. United States 870
A.2d 1193(2005).

30

Best v. Kelly, 879 F. Supp. 305 (1995).

31

Smith, 494. U.S.

32

Flores 521 U.S. at 536.
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if a religious conviction is sincere. In using the rational basis test,
there is no need for the courts to make such a decision. However, in
many cases it will be obvious whether or not a religious conviction
is sincere. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,33 it seems evident that
the Amish people’s beliefs are sincere because they date back to the
1600s and are strictly adhered to by the Amish population. If the
plaintiff was an honest follower of the Amish faith, it would appear
that his convictions would likewise be sincere. However, though the
sincerity of one’s beliefs in many cases may be obvious, there will be
cases in which the decision may not be as clear.34 Yet even if the court
is faced with some cases in which the line is not apparent, such situations should not prohibit all others from the right to appeal for a defense of their religious freedom against laws of general applicability.
The rational basis test may also make it easier for the courts to
draw a firm line: if the law is rational and not aimed at burdening
religion then it stands, regardless of the burden that it may place
upon religion. Having a firm line in deciding cases may be convenient; however, is this really a line that we want to draw? If such
were the case, then the Amish children would have been forced to
go to school regardless of the fact that such a law would severely affect the Amish way of life. Allowing this exception does not
dramatically affect others, and thus it seems extreme not to allow
such an exception. However, under the rational basis test there is
no room for such exceptions. Though the rational basis test may
reduce the difficulty of deciding when a religious belief should take
precedence over a law of general applicability, religious freedom is
something important enough to not be discarded simply because it
is “too difficult” to protect.
One final concern is that a compelling interest test may allow for
discrimination. It is true that there are some cases in which people’s
religious preferences have allowed for discrimination.35 However,
while allowing discrimination may not be preferable, it is necessary
33

Yoder, 406 U.S.

34

E.g. Trujillo, 2 P.3d. and Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (1979).

35

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 531 U.S. 1143
(2001).
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in some instances in order to protect religious freedom. Protecting
religious freedom over antidiscrimination is justifiable as religious
freedom is explicitly protected within the Constitution and the right
against discrimination is not. In addition, not allowing for religious
rights to trump anti-discriminatory rights can in effect turn the discrimination against religion. Thus, religious freedom should take
precedence over anti-discriminatory laws.
B. Benefits of the Compelling Interest Test
Perhaps the greatest defense of the compelling interest test is
that it does a better job protecting religious freedom than does the
rational basis test. There are many cases that show that when the
compelling interest test is used, religious freedom is more likely to
be upheld. For example:
One recent case that applied the rational basis test rather than
the compelling interest test was North Coast Women’s Care Medical
Group Inc. v. The Superior Court of San Diego County. In this case,
which was brought before the California Supreme court in August
of 2008, a lesbian woman was being treated at a fertility clinic to try
to become pregnant.36 However, the doctor she was working with
informed her in advance that if an intrauterine insemination (IUI)
became necessary, the doctor’s religious beliefs would prevent her
from performing the procedure on an unmarried woman. Another
doctor at the clinic also refused to perform the procedure for
religious purposes, and they referred her to another doctor at another
clinic who would be willing to perform the procedure. However,
there were complications in the procedure and the woman was
unable to get pregnant for almost another year. She sued the North
Coast Women’s Medical Care clinic for damages, claiming that they
unfairly discriminated against her on the basis of sexual orientation.
The claimant in this case appealed under Unruh, one of California’s antidiscriminatory statutes. The court applied the rational basis
test and found that Unruh was a valid law of general applicability
and that under the ruling in Smith no further compelling interest
36

N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group Inc. v. The Super. Ct. of San Diego
County/Benitez, 2006 Cal. App. 504 (2006).
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test was necessary. The doctors at the medical clinic were required
to perform artificial inseminations regardless of marital status or
sexual orientation, notwithstanding their religious convictions. The
rational basis test upheld the antidiscriminatory law over the defendant’s right to religious freedom.
Another case that failed to use the compelling interest test, Sunderland v. United States, had similar results. In this case a man was
convicted of marijuana use, though he appealed to his First Amendment right to use the drug for religious purposes.37 The Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that RFRA was not applicable to the states
and that therefore they would hold to the ruling in Smith. Because
they used the rational basis test rather than the compelling interest
test, the court ruled that the drug law was generally applicable and
not a hybrid right case and therefore was not subject to exceptions,
regardless of the burden that it placed on the individual’s religious
convictions. Once again, the law of general applicability did not even
have to undergo a two pronged test in order for it to burden a citizen’s
religious freedom.
On the other hand, there have been many cases concerning religious freedom in states that have adopted mini RFRAs that have
been successful in protecting religious freedom because of the application of the compelling interest test. Two examples of these cases
are Merced v. Kasson and Barr v. City of Sinton.
In Merced v. Kasson,38 a priest whose religious beliefs required
the sacrifice of animals lived in a city in Texas that had six ordinances against animal sacrifice. However, by an appeal to TRFRA,
Texas’s state RFRA, he was given an injunction to allow him to
sacrifice animals for religious purposes despite the city ordinances.
TRFRA was able to allow for this because the court saw that the
city ordinances were substantially burdening the priest’s religion
without furthering a compelling governmental interest using the
least restrictive means possible. In this case, the use of the compelling interest test helped the court to see that there was no interest
more important than this person’s religious freedom. However, this
37

Sunderland v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, (1924).

38

Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, (2009).
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does not mean that there will not be instances in which the government does have a compelling interest. For example, if this case
had concerned human sacrifice, the government would have had
a compelling interest to prohibit the religious practice in order to
preserve human life.
In Barr v. City of Sinton,39 a man offered housing and religious
education to recently released prisoners as part of his religious ministry. In response to this, the city passed an ordinance that forbade
such actions. This case was brought before a trial court and a court
of appeals, both of which found no violations with TRFRA. However, it was soon to be brought before the Supreme Court of Texas,
which said that TRFRA requires strict scrutiny of every case that
appeals to religion, and that zoning ordinances were not exempt
from the scrutiny. Applying this strict scrutiny to the case, the Court
found that the man was acting on sincere religious beliefs and that
there was no compelling governmental interest to impose this ordinance upon him and thus stop his ministry. Once again, appealing to
the compelling interest test allowed this man to practice his religion
without burdening his religious practice by laws of general applicability.
Another interesting case that shows the crux of the issue is
Yang v. Sturner.40 Originally applying the compelling interest test,
the Yangs were granted a summary judgment motion on the basis
that their free exercise of religion had been burdened when a doctor
performed an autopsy on their dead son without their permission
(desecrating a corpse in any way was against their religious beliefs).
However, Smith concluded right before the damages portion of the
case and under the newly instituted rational basis test, the Yangs
were unable to collect damages. It seems as if the compelling interest
test had remained, they would have collected damages for the burden that had been placed upon their religion. As evidenced in these
cases, the compelling interest test often does a more effective job of
preserving religious freedom than the rational basis test does.

39

Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287 (2009).

40

Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (1990).
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However, the plethora of cases that demonstrate its success is not
the only reason for adopting a compelling interest test over a rational
basis test. As Congress found in enacting RFRA, the compelling interest test also seems to “strike a reasonable balance”41 between freedom of religion and governmental interests. The rational basis test
gives almost complete preference to governmental interests; in contrast, the compelling interest test allows for religious freedom while
still giving preference to governmental interest when appropriate.
For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are obviously not justifiable simply because they were done in the name of
religion, and the government has a duty to prevent such acts (even on
a much smaller level) that detract from other citizens’ basic rights,
such as life and liberty. It is the duty of the government to protect
the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of its citizens, and individuals should not be able to infringe upon these fundamental human
rights, even in the name of religion. The compelling interest test is a
sensible balance between the two extremes—it allows for religious
freedom as far as possible but curtails it when the government has
a pressing interest that must be maintained. The compelling interest
test contains the flexibility necessary to weigh the interests of religion against the interests of the government, while the rational basis
test does not allow for such flexibility.
In addition, the Constitution explicitly protects religious freedom,42
and it does not seem that the rational basis test protects religious freedom sufficiently from laws of general applicability. Some may argue
that this was not the intent of the First Amendment;43 however, the
Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion].”44 Many laws of general applicability
can inadvertently prohibit the free exercise of some religions just as
can laws directly targeted at prohibiting religious freedom. The com41

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3

42

U.S. Const. amend. I.

43

Patrik Weil, Why the French Lai’cite Is Liberal, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 357
(2003).

44	U.S. Const. amend. I.
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pelling interest test most effectively protects religion from laws that
would prohibit its free exercise.
An additional defense of the compelling interest test was brought
up in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Employment Division v. Smith. She claims that very few states would be naïve enough
to create a law directly targeting religious freedom.45 Though there
are some exceptions to this in which the rational basis test was effective46 it is usually not the case that a law is directly targeted at
religion or otherwise not rationally legislated. Thus, there are not
many cases in which the rational basis test would actually protect religious freedom because under this test if the law does not meet one
of these two criteria, it automatically takes preference over religious
freedom. Therefore, in order to best protect religious freedom, it will
be necessary for states to adopt a compelling interest test.
Upholding a compelling interest test in cases regarding religious
freedom is also imperative because the compelling interest test is
the highest level of judicial review, while the rational basis test
is the lowest level of judicial review.47 Should not our religious
freedom be a precious enough right to protect it with the strictest
scrutiny that our judicial system has to offer? Compelling interest
tests are utilized in cases involving constitutional rights (such as the
right to freedom of speech and the right to vote) as well as in cases
involving suspect classes (such as race).48 Our religious freedom is
just as valuable as our other constitutional rights and ought to be
protected equally. This is why freedom of religion had previously
been protected by the compelling interest test and ought to continue
to be so protected. In addition, if classes such as race or gender can
qualify as suspect classes, should religion not qualify as well? In
45

Smith, 494 U.S.

46

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993).

47

Greg Rubio, Surviving Rodriguez: The Viability of Federal Equal
Protection Claims By Undefunded Charter Schools, 2008 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 1643, 1648 (2008).

48

Id.
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either case, it is only just to apply the compelling interest test to
cases involving our religious freedom.
Continuing along the lines of justice, in 2000 Congress
enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUPIA).49 This act mandates a compelling interest test in religious
cases involving land use or prisoners. So, in many states, prisoners
are currently enjoying far greater protection of their religious
freedom than the rest of the population. It seems counter-intuitive
and unjust to give convicts greater religious protection than lawabiding citizens.

IV. Conclusion
Since Flores, it has been left up to the states to adopt their own
compelling interest test, as it was ruled that RFRA could not be imposed upon the states. While many states have already taken measures to provide for this test, there are still many that are relying on
the rational basis test to protect the religious freedom of their citizens. However, as we can see from this analysis of the benefits and
costs of both the compelling interest test and the rational basis test,
the benefits of the compelling interest test far outweigh those of the
rational basis test. In order for those states that have not yet provided
for a compelling interest test within their legislation to better protect the religious freedom of their citizens, it is expedient that they
replace the rational basis test with the compelling interest test. The
compelling interest test truly is the most sensible balance in protecting religious freedom.

49

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3

